Dangerous Games on the Korean Peninsula

Earlier this month, 300,000 South Korean and 17,000 American troops participated in exercises the Pentagon called “the largest ever.”  An aircraft carrier, two guided missile destroyers, a cruiser, F-35 stealth fighters and drones converged on South Korea in an unprecedented show of force. North Korea responded with sharp warnings that “If (the U.S.) infringes on (North Korea’s) sovereignty and dignity even a bit, it will launch merciless ultra-precision strikes from ground, air, sea, and underwater…”  Thus, while the Trump Administration no doubt hoped Secretary of State Tillerson’s first overseas trip could focus on advancing the president’s new “America First” message and convincing our allies to do more, Tillerson was compelled to spend much of his trip seeking cooperation on North Korea. 

U.S. options for responding to the future threat of North Korea’s nuclear-armed missiles range from hoping for resolution through dialogue to all-out war. After Tillerson’s very tough warnings early in his trip, China advised calm and negotiations, and Tillerson seemed to agree. However, history warns of the risks of deal-making with Pyongyang. After the Clinton administration reached agreement on halting North Korea’s nuclear program in 1994, Pyongyang secretly continued to develop nuclear weapons. So any agreement without an unprecedented degree of intrusive on-site verification is not likely to reassure anyone. Recognizing this, Tillerson stated, “We had 20 years of failed approaches…a new approach is needed.”

The chances of North Korea voluntarily abandoning its nuclear and missile programs are practically zero. Having already tested five nuclear weapons and, in early March, launching four missiles into the waters off Japan while publicly announcing the move as a “dry run for an attack on U.S. bases,” Pyongyang shows zero interest in talks. 

The U.S. could seek still more sanctions against North Korea. In February, alarmed by the flurry of missile tests, Beijing announced it was halting purchases of North Korean coal for the rest of 2017, a decision that cut North Korean exports in half. Perhaps more economic pressure might affect the Kim regime, but from Beijing’s perspective, sanctions run the risk of so weakening the North Korean economy that the North Korea-China border is overrun by economic refugees. 

Continuing on the spectrum of options, there are covert actions that are likely already in play. Mirroring the game plan used against Iran, the U.S. has reportedly been conducting cyber-attacks against Pyongyang’s programs, and has covertly sabotaged raw materials and equipment destined for North Korean nuclear and missile efforts. Clandestine espionage and infiltration efforts also seem to be ongoing. But as the Iran experience shows, such efforts can only slow Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programs, not stop them.

Regime change is a more extreme option. Arguably China and the U.S., as well as South Korea and Japan, would welcome Kim Jong-un being replaced with a more malleable figure. But how to do this without Kim taking the region down in flames with him? Regime change through clandestine or military ops could be even more dangerous than the current situation.

This brings us to the opposite end of the spectrum -- pre-emptive military action, something that Secretary Tillerson has confirmed is “on the table.” What could this option look like?

If the U.S. determines that North Korea is close to threatening us with a nuclear strike, the president would feel compelled to use whatever means necessary to prevent such an attack. There are several non-nuclear options (developed as contingencies for Iran) that would use our massive ground-penetrating bombs to target North Korea’s underground facilities while preemptive attacks would seek to cripple North Korea’s fixed facilities and simultaneously destroy its relatively primitive submarines. But if conventional warheads were assessed as not adequate to the task, pre-emptive military action might also have to involve “small” nuclear weapons that could dive deep underground. This “nuclear option” would cross a threshold that no nation has dared to breach since 1945.

And there are obvious huge downsides to military action. First, it’s not clear that military strikes would succeed. We would have to destroy North Korea’s entire offensive capabilities before Kim could detonate a single nuclear warhead. Over 25 million South Koreans live less than 20 miles from the DMZ, easily within range of the thousands of North Korean artillery pieces along the border. At the first hint of an all-out attack, North Korea could fire 500,000 rounds of artillery on northern Seoul within the first hour. 

So clearly, any action to either remove the Kim regime or decapitate its nuclear capability must be virtually instantaneous and its outcome a certainty – a tough order. The last thing we want is a Syria-like conflict that overturns the North Korean dictator but not before he demolishes the decades of progress achieved in the south.

Also, a surprise attack on a sovereign country smacks of Pearl Harbor – it’s not how civilized nations deal with threats. Military strikes would have enormous ramifications throughout the region: How would the North Korean military and population react? If Kim Jong-un were replaced, what would come next? Military action without China’s acquiescence could also end up reigniting the 65-year-old Korean conflict, this time pitting U.S. and South Korean forces against two nuclear-armed adversaries.

Bottom line: This is an issue that tests the administration’s ability to balance its “America First” slogan with the diplomacy needed to gain the cooperation of key players, particularly China. We need to move quickly to create an international consensus behind what few non-military options remain. To do this, the U.S. needs an empowered national security team that is meeting regularly, trusts and respects the other players, and isn’t worried about being blind-sided by unexpected random public signals. What should be obvious is that a U.S. decision to use military force could make an already dangerous crisis into one that might trigger even more dangerous moves by China or Russia. Preventing a worst-case scenario out of North Korea requires a global solution.

Jack Segal was NSC Director for Non-Proliferation from 1998-2000. He and his wife Karen Puschel serve as co-chairs of the International Affairs Forum (tciaf.com) in Traverse City.

View On Our Website